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This paper shows how growth in financially open developing countries is affected when 
relations with international lenders suffer from the danger of moral hazard. We find that if 
entrepreneurs can gamble with foreign creditors’ money, borrowing under standard debt 
contracts is constrained by a No-Gambling Condition similar to that in Hellmann, Murdock, 
and Stiglitz (2000). However, this incentive constraint is endogenous in the development 
process: growth increases entrepreneurs’ own capital at risk and thus reduces incentives to 
gamble. But capital accumulation also decreases the profitability of investment, which has 
the opposite effect. General equilibrium under moral hazard shows a unique and stable 
steady state, but involves at least temporary rationing of profitable projects and possibly 
positive net investment by developing countries in international financial markets. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The literature on international finance has frequently highlighted the incentive 
problems associated with cross-border capital flows. Often, implicit guarantees to 
foreign creditors, by domestic governments or via the prospect of IMF bailouts, are seen 
to cause a moral hazard situation, where creditors have no incentives to make sure that 
their money is prudently invested.
1 One standard policy recommendation is thus to 
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1 Thus, Krugman (1998) argues that the main story behind the 1997 Asian crisis is that of moral hazard 
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eliminate guarantees in order to make foreign creditors bear the risk of their investment. 
However, removing guarantees does of course not eliminate the problem of 
asymmetric information at the origin of moral hazard. As studies on domestic 
lender-borrower relations (such as Holmström and Tirole (1997), or Hellmann, Murdock 
and Stiglitz (2000)) show, moral hazard-type conflicts of interest arise under standard 
debt contracts whenever limited liability borrowers have insufficient own capital at risk, 
or insufficient prospective profits. In the absence of guarantees, international lenders 
will take into account these incentive problems for their lending policy if information 
asymmetries rule out contracts contingent on borrower behaviour. Creditors effectively 
impose a “No-Gambling Condition” (Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000)), which 
constrains lending by minimum capital requirements for borrowers, conditional on the 
profitability of their projects. For poor countries that lack sufficient own capital but offer 
numerous investment opportunities, this may well be a severe constraint, with important 
consequences for the supposedly beneficial impact of international capital mobility. 
This line of argument shows that incentive problems can affect the ability of poor 
countries to attract funds, and thus constrain growth. But conversely, capital 
accumulation and economic growth seem to play an important role for incentives. They 
provide countries more own capital to signal incentives for prudent investment, but 
presumably also reduce marginal returns to capital and thus profits. As opposed to 
partial equilibrium models of moral hazard in financial markets, which usually take the 
profit structure as given, this double role of capital accumulation for incentives - a 
beneficial “capital at risk effect” and a negative “profit effect” - requires an analysis that 
endogenises both capital and profits. Thus, only a dynamic general equilibrium model 
can show the reciprocal relation between incentives, which constrain capital 
accumulation, and growth, which determines incentives via capital and profits. This in 
fact is the endeavour of the present paper. 
We analyse the consequences of moral hazard in financial markets for growth in 
open developing economies when international creditors impose a No-Gambling 
Condition à la Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000). The two main determinants of 
this incentive constraint, entrepreneurs’ own capital and expected profits from 
investment, are made endogenous in the growth process using a simple overlapping 
generations growth model of the Diamond (1965)-type. Adding our incentive constraint 
to the otherwise entirely neo-classical model yields results quite different from those of 
standard growth theory: despite international capital mobility, poor economies with low 
own capital will converge only slowly to a steady state, where output may be lower than 
it would have been without moral hazard. Moreover, not only the degree but also the 
existence of moral hazard is shown to be endogenous in the growth process: decreasing 
marginal returns to capital are crucial in that for high marginal productivity there is no 
 
leading to “pangloss” overinvestment: without control by implicitly insured lenders, limited liability 
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moral hazard problem, which only arises at some point in the development process. The 
net effect of further capital accumulation on incentives, combining the impact of rising 
capital at risk and falling marginal returns, is shown to be positive. We thus show a 
causal link from capital accumulation to moral hazard, as opposed to the reverse 
“pangloss” investment mechanism, where moral hazard leads to overaccumulation of 
capital. 
Our paper draws on two main sources in the literature: we take our incentive 
structure from the Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) article on the danger of banks 
gambling after the liberalisation of domestic financial markets. But we endogenise 
profits as a function of aggregate capital in the economy while taking the opportunity 
costs of funds as exogenously determined in international capital markets. This yields a 
situation of capital-constrained borrowing not very different from that in Holmström and 
Tirole (1997). On the other hand, our overlapping generations framework is most similar 
to those in Boyd and Smith (1997), or Ma and Smith (1996) that are part of a small but 
growing literature on growth under asymmetric information in financial markets (see 
also Boyd and Smith (1992), Huybens and Smith (1998), Gertler and Rogoff (1990) or 
Sakuragawa and Hamada (2001)). However, this literature usually relies either on the 
assumption of pure credit constraints prevailing under costly state verification
2 (notably 
the work of Smith et al.) or on exogenous profitability of capital. Both assumptions are 
in our view quite restrictive, which is why we choose a simple moral hazard framework, 
where however both profits and moral hazard are endogenous in the growth process. 
Atkeson (1991) looks at a similar problem of incentive-constrained international lending, 
but in a context of infinitely-lived agents, and adds the possibility of debt repudiation. 
The paper proceeds as follows: After presenting a simple small open economy 
growth model with moral hazard in financial relations (2), we analyse partial equilibrium 
in financial markets (3), as well as dynamic general equilibrium (4) and give some 
comparative static results (5). Our conclusion includes suggestions on policy responses 
and further research. 
 
 
2.    A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY MODEL WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
 
This section describes an overlapping generations growth model of a small open 
economy that faces moral hazard in an intermediate capital-investment sector. 
Entrepreneurs have the possibility to “gamble” with borrowed money by investing in a 
risky but inefficient asset. Their incentives to do so are governed by two factors: 
expected profits from successful investment projects increase incentives to avoid failure 
and thus to invest prudently. And entrepreneurs’ own finance in their project discourages 
 
2 The seminal paper on pure credit constraints in a domestic costly state verification framework is Gale and 
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gambling due to a “capital at risk” effect. When international creditors are aware of this 
incentive structure but cannot observe gambling unless a project fails, borrowing can be 
capital - constrained by a simple No-Gambling condition - a one-period version of that 
in Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) with endogenised profits. In fact, both 
incentive effects, the capital at risk and the “profit” effect, depend on aggregate capital 
in the economy and are thus endogenous in the development process. 
 
2.1.  Agents 
 
The population of the economy consists of overlapping generations of two-period 
lived agents. Each generation is assumed to be large and of constant size, normalized to 
one for simplicity. Given the large population, agents neglect the influence of their 
individual decisions on the aggregate economy. Agents are endowed with one unit of 
labour when young, which they supply inelastically to earn the going wage rate in the 
economy,  , and retire at the beginning of period two. They are risk-neutral and care 
only about period 2 consumption. Thus 
t w
 
old C c U = ) ( .                                                       ( A 1 )  
 
This utility function is maximised by agents subject to the limited liability constraint 
that agents’ wealth cannot be negative. 
Agents have two saving opportunities to transfer their wage to the consumption 
period. They can either buy financial assets that yield the international gross rate of 
return  , or invest in investment projects as described below.  i
International lenders are numerous, risk-neutral and ready to lend any amount at the 
expected rate of return  . Since our economy is small, it has no influence on this going 
rate of interest. 
i
 
2.2.    Production of Capital Goods 
 
There are two sectors in the economy. Capital for the production of final goods is 
produced in an intermediate investment sector with a linear technology that requires 
discrete investment in “projects.” All agents are born with their specific project, say a 
technology or investment “idea,” that they cannot sell but only carry out themselves. 
These intermediate sector projects need an indivisible financial investment of size q at 
the end of period t in order to yield capital at the beginning of  1 + t . This capital is then 
used to produce final goods and paid the going rental rate  .   1 + t R
The investment projects play a crucial role in the analysis. Their size differs between 
some lower bound  q, and an upper bound Q. Before they are born, agents are randomly 
assigned a project by independent draws from the probability density function g(q). 
Given the law of large numbers g(q) is equal to the density of investment opportunities EMERGING MARKET LENDING: IS MORAL HAZARD ENDOGENOUS?  45 
in the economy. Furthermore, g(q) is assumed to be differentiable and of mass 1 (i.e., 
0 ) ( = q G  and   with G(q) the associated cumulative distribution function). 
Also we assume 
1 ) ( = Q G
 
t all for w Q t > .                                                 ( A 2 )  
 
Thus, there is always at least one project that needs outside finance to be realised. 
The output of investment projects in terms of capital depends on which of two 
investment technologies is employed: agents can opt for a prudent investment 
technology that yields q units of capital with probability one, or for a “gambling” 
technology that yields  q q > β   units of capital with probability  π , and zero otherwise. 
We make the following assumptions about  β  and π , 
 
β πβ < <1 .                                                        ( A 3 )  
 
(A3) states that the gambling technology is less efficient since its expected return is 
lower than that of the safe technology. However, returns from gambling are higher if the 
project is successful. 
The reason for this particular set-up of gambling in an intermediate investment 
sector is to show the effects of falling marginal productivity of capital on entrepreneurs’ 
incentives to gamble. In fact, one important difference between our No-Gambling 
Condition and that of Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) is that in our model, 
profits are endogenous and thus affected by decreasing marginal returns. 
“Gambling” can intuitively be interpreted in different ways. One interpretation of 
our model is of projects to be financial companies that provide capital services to firms. 
These financial companies would then have the possibility to gamble by engaging in 
risk-shifting, as in Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) or in Krugman (1998), or by 




2.3.    Production of Consumption Goods 
 
There is a single final consumption good in the economy that is produced by the 
production technology   using labour (N) and capital (K), the output from 
investment projects. The production technology satisfies  ,   and 
Inada conditions, where capital-letter subscripts denote derivatives. Capital is assumed 
) , ( N K F F =
0 ) ( > K FK 0 ) ( < K FKK
 
3 At least in the case of financial services companies, one would probably want to limit the possible number 
of these companies to some fraction of the population, which however only adds one parameter to our model 
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to depreciate fully in production. 
We thus have two production technologies: a binary investment technology that 
yields capital, and a well-behaved neo-classical technology that combines this capital 
with labour to produce consumption goods, a framework similar to those of Boyd and 
Smith (1997), or Ma and Smith (1996). Note that we do not include technological 
progress. Since also our population is assumed to be constant, there will be no steady 
state growth in the model. We choose this simplifying framework since we are primarily 
interested in the convergence process to the steady state, and the steady state level of 
capital and output per capita under asymmetric information with respect to the full 
information case. 
 
2.4.  Information  Structure 
 
Lenders are assumed to have ex ante information about agents’ preferences, the 
proportion of their wealth (or, which is equivalent in this framework, the proportion of 
last period’s wage) that entrepreneurs invest in their own projects and their investment 
technology options. However, ex post they have no information about de facto payoffs 
or the chosen production technology unless they see the project fail. Failure reveals the 
zero payoff and thus the investment technology employed (since the prudent technology 
never fails). But limited liability means that there cannot be any financial penalties in the 
failure case, since borrower wealth is zero (assuming full equity participation, an inssue 
which we will look at below). So lenders cannot ex post punish entrepreneurs for 
choosing the wrong technology: if gambling is successful they cannot observe the choice 
of technology, if it fails there is no possibility of punishment as entrepreneurs have no 
funds left. 
One strong assumption is that lenders know the gambling technology. It is not 
immediate that lenders have a chance to observe this, as in equilibrium gambling will 
often be avoided. So one may want to interpret the gambling technology as a “worst case 
guess” by lenders, against which they try to be robust. 
Note that this setup does not allow for monitoring of projects. Monitoring could be 
introduced by assuming that lenders can observe the chosen technology at a certain cost. 
Broer (2001) shows the effects this has in the current framework. 
 
 
3.  EQUILIBRIUM  IN  FINANCIAL  MARKETS 
 
We start by analysing the partial equilibrium in financial markets. The analysis is 
partial in the sense that it takes the expected return to capital and entrepreneurs’ wages as 
given, to derive equilibrium investment as a function of the international interest rate and 
incentive constraints. In a general equilibrium analysis we will afterwards endogenise 
profits and wages to derive the impact of economic development on incentive constraints 
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3.1.  Contracts,  Incentive  Constraints and Definition of Equilibrium 
 
A contract in our setup is an agreement that specifies the size of a loan b that an 
international lender gives an entrepreneur in period t, and the repayments T made in period 
. Payments are potentially a function of all observable characteristics of entrepreneurs 
(i.e., the size of their idiosyncratic project and their equity stake in the project) and those 
states of nature in period    that are distinguishable ex post. 
1 + t
1 + t
Since both entrepreneurs and lenders are assumed to be risk-neutral, individual 
rationality constraints simply require that both get, for every contract, at least expected 
returns equal to the opportunity costs of funds i, where expectations are taken conditional 
on information that may differ between lenders and entrepreneurs. The individual 
rationality constraint for lenders is thus 
 
ib p pT E > − + = Γ 0 * ) 1 ( ] [ ,                                            ( I R 1 )  
 
where    are returns to the lender in different states of nature, b is the size of the loan, 
and p denotes the probability that the project is successful. (Note that for the remainder 
of this section we drop time subscripts for period t variables for convenience.) 
Γ
The individual rationality constraint for entrepreneurs is equivalently 
 
wi b T b w R p E t ≥ − + = Π + )] ( ) ( [ ] [ 1 τ ,                                    ( I R 2 )  
 
where   indicates profits in different states of nature,   is the rental rate on 
capital in the next period,   is the amount of period t borrower wealth invested in the 
project and 
Π 1 + t R
w
τ  equals payoff in units of capital when the project goes through (and so 
equals 1 for prudent investors and  1 > β  for  gamblers). 
To define equilibrium in financial markets, note that projects cannot be sold by 
entrepreneurs who are the only ones that have the knowledge to run them. It is thus the 
number of projects that adjusts to yield equilibrium in financial markets and not their 
prices.
4 Equilibrium is thus characterised by a set of optimal contracts, a set of projects 
that gets carried out and a technology chosen for each of these, such that individual 
rationality constraints and the limited liability constraint of borrowers hold. 
To derive the structure of the optimal contract, note that agents have complete 
monopoly power over their investment project, and that international capital markets are 
competitive. So without loss of generality we can assume that entrepreneurs propose a 
contract as a take-it-or-leave-it offer to creditors, thus maximising their profits subject to 
the constraints. 
 
4 Allen and Gale (2000) present a model where moral hazard and risk shifting under standard debt contracts 
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3.2.  Optimal  Contracts  and  Equilibrium under Full Information 
 
Note that in the described lending relation there are 3 possible states of the world that 
determine payoffs. The first corresponds to the prudent investment being chosen, the 
second to a risky investment that is successful, the third to a risky investment that has 
failed. In the benchmark case of full and free information, contracts can be contingent on 
all states of the world, plus borrower characteristics. If we assume full equity participation, 
i.e., entrepreneurs invest their entire wealth and only borrow what they need to carry out 
their project, the payment when the project fails is necessarily zero. The design of the 
optimal contract is equivalent to choosing payments in states one and two, such that (IR1) 
holds with equality for both technologies individually, and for all b. So transfers are 
simply   and  b i T * = B i T * /π =  for the prudent and risky technologies respectively. In 
other words, the optimal contract is a standard debt contract. Entrepreneurs pay a constant 
interest rate r, with  i r =  or  π / i r =   for safe and risky projects respectively, unless they 
go bankrupt. Note that interest rates are independent of entrepreneur characteristics, i.e., do 
not depend on their wealth or the size of their project. 
Given standard debt contracts, the resulting equilibrium is very simple and emerges 
from the two individual rationality constraints: Entrepreneurs will invest as long as 
expected returns to their projects net of interest payments are greater than their opportunity 
costs.  
However, expected profits    from gambling are with  Π π / i r = . 
 
, ) ]( [
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              ( 1 )  
 
where the inequality follows from assumption (A3) that the gambling technology has 
lower expected output. 
(1) shows two things: first, under full information it is never optimal for agents to 
gamble. And second, in equilibrium all projects get realised as long as   is greater 
than i. 
1 + t R
 
3.3.  Optimal  Contracts  and  Equilibrium under Asymmetric Information 
 
We first show that even under asymmetric information, the optimal contract is 
simply a standard debt contract. In a second step, we derive the conditions for the 
projects that get finance in equilibrium. 
 
Standard Debt Contracts 
 
Under asymmetric information, payments from entrepreneurs to lenders can only be EMERGING MARKET LENDING: IS MORAL HAZARD ENDOGENOUS?  49 
made contingent on the technology if the project fails, as lenders cannot distinguish 
“success” states one and two. Again, payments if the project fails are necessarily zero, so 
the design of the optimal contract reduces to choosing an amount T that borrowers 
transfer to lenders when the project is successful. To see that the optimal contract is 
simply a standard debt contract, note first that the payment T can be conditioned on the 
amount of their own wealth that entrepreneurs invest. Furthermore, for a given T 
expected profits to entrepreneurs from prudent and risky investment projects are 
respectively. 
 
]. ) ( [ ) (
, ) ( ) (
1
1
T b w R E
T b w R E
t gambling
t prudent
− + = Π
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The important thing to note is that for given T profits increase linearly with w, but at 
different rates: profits from prudent investment increase faster than profits from risky 
investment as  1 < πβ . Thus, for a given level of borrowing and transfers, there is a level 
w* (not necessarily positive) that makes profits from gambling equal to those from 
prudent investment. Entrepreneurs that invest less own capital will prefer to gamble, 
entrepreneurs that invest more will invest prudently. This means entrepreneurs with 
enough equity can obtain the same contracts as those for the prudent technology under 
full information, as lenders know they will never gamble. But the best contract that 
entrepreneurs with little equity can obtain is that for the risky technology and involves a 
hefty external finance premium. Thus, under asymmetric information we get the same 
standard debt contracts as under full information. But interest rates are conditional on 
the funds that entrepreneurs invest in their projects, not on the chosen technology which 
is unobservable. 
 
No-Gambling Condition and Maximum Project Size 
 
Conditional on a standard debt contract with interest rate i, we can express the 
condition that agents’ (pure) profits from investing prudently must be higher than 
expected profits from gambling as follows
5
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Π > Π
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Taken w and   as given, and again imposing maximum equity participation, we 
can solve this for b, which yields an upper bound on borrowing, the No-Gambling Condition   
1 + t R
 
5 In the following, it turns out to be convenient to phrase the discussion in terms of pure profits, i.e., there is 
always an opportunity cost of wi to own funds invested in projects. TOBIAS BROER  50 
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From NGC we get the maximum project size q* as the sum of period 1 wage income 
and the maximum loan size 
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NGC makes borrowing of entrepreneurs constrained by w, their own capital in 
projects, the expected return   and international interest rates. Intuitively, own 
capital mitigates the moral hazard problem because the entrepreneur faces the whole 
down-side risk on this invested capital: His opportunity cost in the bad state is wi, the 
gains from the alternative investment in the safe asset yielding safe return i. That means 
that his net expected loss from gambling with his own capital equals the difference in 
expected payoffs between the two technologies, 
1 + t R
0 ) 1 ( < − − πβ wR . These losses are 
opposed to expected gains from gambling with borrowed money of  )] ( ) ( [ i R i R b − − − β π . 
NGC then says that for prudent investment to be optimal, the expected gains from 
gambling with borrowed capital have to be smaller than the expected losses from 
gambling with the amount of own capital employed in the project. 
Thus, entrepreneurs with little own capital will pay a potentially large external 
finance premium of  π π / ) 1 ( − , as they are assumed to gamble with creditors’ funds. If 
we interpret the gambling technology as a “worst case” scenario for creditors, implying 
a small probability of payoff  π , then this external finance premium might be too large 
for the project to go through. Entrepreneurs with great ideas but no capital will then 
never be able to borrow and realise their project. The condition for this to be the case is 
 
0 ] * / ) ( [ ) ( 1 < − − + = Π + iw b i b w R E t gambling π β π  
). /( 1 πβ i R R risky t = < ⇔ +  
 
In our model, information asymmetries can thus cause some entrepreneurs with 
profitable investment opportunities to get rationed in equilibrium. However, it is 
interesting to note that for those projects that do get financing, there is no external 
finance premium - they can borrow at the international riskless rate i. This is different 
for example to models such as Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), where a variable 
external finance premium drives most of the results. This is because in our model 
projects do not fail in equilibrium, as entrepreneurs that meet NGC always invest 
prudently and the return to prudent investment is non-stochastic. This differs from a 
costly state verification setup such as that in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, where the 
probability of failure of investment projects, and thus the expected auditing costs that EMERGING MARKET LENDING: IS MORAL HAZARD ENDOGENOUS?  51 














Figure 1.    Profits from Gambling and Prudent Investment for Given Wealth 









Figure 2.    Increasing Wealth by  w Δ   Increases the Maximum Project Size by    w q Δ > ΔTOBIAS BROER  52 
A Graphical Representation of the Equilibrium 
 
Figure 1 shows how for fixed w and R entrepreneurs’ expected profits are higher 
from gambling than from investing prudently above the threshold size q* given by 
. Figure 2 shows how higher wages, or wealth at the end of period 1, increase q* 
by more than the change in w. This is the capital at risk effect of rising entrepreneur own 
capital on borrowing limits. This can also be shown by differentiating   with 
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Figure 3.    Maximum Project Size q* as a Function of the Rental Rate R 
NGC is not binding for high rates of profit 
 
 
Figure 3 shows how the maximum project size for debt finance q* rises with 
profitability, i.e., the rental rate of capital R. This is because the effect of a marginal rise 
in R on profits from prudent investment, equal to 1, is bigger than its impact on profits 
from gambling,  1 < πβ , thus reducing incentives to gamble as R rises. Intuitively, as 
entrepreneurs only make profits in good states, they like high probabilities of success the 
more, the higher the possible gains in success states. Creditors who know this will thus 
be willing to lend more money when profits are high, leading to a positive relation 
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between q* and R. This is the profit effect, equivalent to the franchise value effect in a 
multi-period setting, such as Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000). It can be obtained 
algebraically by differentiating NGC’ with respect to  :  1 + t R
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Profits thus relax gambling incentives. In fact, they can even eliminate them 
altogether as we show now.   
 
High profits eliminate incentive problems: The Moral Hazard Condition 
 
Note that all our results so far have been conditional on 
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Figure 3 shows why this is the case: NGC’ is not binding for values higher than 
, since in this case the denominator in NGC becomes negative and the inequality is 
reversed, such that NGC holds for all positive values of borrowing. In other words, 
agents’ borrowing is not incentive-constrained for high values of R. The intuition for this 
is that entrepreneurs gain from gambling since under limited liability they need not (and 
cannot) pay the contractual interest in the bad state. This leads to an expected gain from 
lower interest payments of 
NGC R
0 ) 1 ( > −π bi . However, the borrower loses from the lower 
expected payoffs on the borrowed capital, equal to  0 ) 1 ( < − − βπ bR . NGC only applies 
when the sum of the two is positive, i.e., when there are gains from gambling with 
borrowed money. This yields the Moral-Hazard-Condition (MHC) that NGC only binds 
for a rental rate of capital below  . In our general equilibrium analysis this is the 
reason why incentives to gamble arise endogenously in the development process as the 
rental rate and thus profits fall. 
NGC R
The denominator in NGC,  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( πβ π − − − R i , can thus be interpreted as the 
“degree of moral hazard”: the higher i, the higher incentives to gamble (since gambling 
reduces interest payments in bad states), the higher R, the lower these are since 
entrepreneurs expected gains from high profitability are less under gambling. 
Note in passing that the impact of the international interest rate on the maximal 
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This also shows that the effect of rising interest rates on q* is smaller the higher the 
interest rate. 
 
Maximum Equity Participation 
 
So far we have assumed that entrepreneurs invest all of their wealth in their project, 
and only borrow the difference between own funds and the required investment. To see 
that this is optimal for risk-neutral entrepreneurs note that by investing an additional unit 
of their wealth in their own project, entrepreneurs never get less (but sometimes more) 
than the opportunity cost i. So they always weakly prefer to invest in their own 
enterprise than in the safe international financial asset. In the following we will thus 




4.  DYNAMIC  GENERAL  EQUILIBRIUM 
 
The previous section showed how a moral hazard problem can lead to a 
No-Gambling constraint that limits borrowing by a function of entrepreneurs’ own 
capital and expected profits of their projects. However, both these variables depend 
crucially on the per capita capital stock in the economy, which makes it natural to 
proceed to a dynamic general equilibrium analysis. More specifically, the number of 
realised projects is affected in two ways in the development process: first of all labour’s 
surplus and wages rise when capital is accumulated, thus leading to more own finance 
and a less constraining No-Gambling Condition (the capital at risk effect). On the other 
hand, capital accumulation leads to a falling marginal productivity of capital, thus a 
falling rental rate and less profits to entrepreneurs. The danger of moral hazard arises 
when profitability falls below the level where gambling with borrowed money suddenly 
becomes optimal, indicated by MHC above. That is, moral hazard arises as a by-product 
of development. Further capital accumulation alleviates the No-Gambling Condition by 
higher capital at risk, but aggravates it by falling marginal returns. In this section, we 
look at the resulting net effect of capital accumulation in general equilibrium, and 
analyse the existence, stability and uniqueness of a steady state in the economy, as well 
as the process of convergence. 
It turns out to be straightforward to derive general equilibrium properties for our 
model, characterised by the competitive market clearing rates for wages and the rental 
rate on capital, the individual rationality conditions (IR1) and (IR2), as well as the 
 
6 In a more general costly state verification framework, Gale and Hellwig (1985) show more formally that 
standard debt contracts with maximum equity participation (i.e., where a risk-neutral borrower puts up all his 
own wealth to co-finance a loan) are indeed optimal. But note that the assumption of risk-neutral agents is 
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No-Gambling Condition. 
 
4.1.  Equilibrium  in  Markets for Labour and Capital 
 
We first derive the equilibrium in the markets for labour and capital to get 
expressions for the wage w, equal to the equity stake of entrepreneurs, and the marginal 
productivity of capital R that determines profits. As both markets are competitive, in 
equilibrium capital and labour are simply paid their marginal product. Therefore 
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We also assume 
 
i K FK < ) ( max ,                                                     ( A 4 )  
 
where    is the capital output when all investment projects get realised. According 
to (A4), it is not efficient to run all projects in the economy, since in that case the 
marginal productivity of capital would be lower than the international rate of return i. 
MAX K
 
4.2.    Benchmark General Equilibrium with Full Information 
 
We have seen above that under full information, it is never optimal for agents to 
gamble. Agents borrow funds and invest these in the prudent technology such that the 
marginal productivity of capital in period t+1, which is the expected return to period t 






K F i R
i w ib b w R E
t K t
t prudent
′ = = ⇔
′ = − + ′ = Π
+ +
+
                                     ( 7 )  
 
(7) implicitly defines a unique level of full information capital  K′, since   is a 
monotonically decreasing function by assumption. So with full information there is no 
convergence process: in line with other simple neoclassical growth models, under full 
information the economy jumps to its steady state capital level 
K F
K′ between period t 
and t+1. Also, under full information entrepreneurs do not earn rents in equilibrium, as 
the profitability of their projects is equal to the international interest rate. TOBIAS BROER  56 
4.3.  General  Equilibrium  under Asymmetric Information 
 
The equilibrium conditions under asymmetric information are more complicated, as 
there are three constraints which may be binding in some stages of the convergence 
process, but not in others. First, we saw that the No-Gambling Condition constrains 
borrowing only below a threshold level of productivity given by the Moral Hazard 
Condition (i.e., for later stages of convergence where capital is more abundant). Second, 
depending on the parameters of the gambling technology, inefficient gambling projects 
may still get financing if they are able to pay the necessary premium (which is more 
likely to be the case in earlier stages where capital is scarce). And finally, the individual 
rationality constraints of creditors and entrepreneurs put a binding upper limit on capital 
intensity, corresponding to a lower limit on the marginal productivity of capital equal to 
the international rate of return. 
Assume for now that the economy is in the region where NGC binds, and where the 
external finance premium is too large for gambling projects to be profitable (i.e., 
) and that   is less than the full information 
capital stock. Under these assumptions the period 
) / , 1 /( ) 1 ( min{ ) ( πβ πβ π i i K F R K − − < = t K
1 + t   capital stock under asymmetric 
information is simply the output of investment projects that get financing according to 
the No-Gambling Condition. Capital output per invested unit of finance is one, since 
when NGC holds no agents gamble. 
The assignment of projects to agents is done by independent draws from the 
distribution g(q) which is normalised to one as well as the number of agents in the 
economy. So the amount of capital in period  1 + t  is simply the expectation of the 
project size conditional on the project being realised, i.e., being smaller than   given 









t dq q qg K ,                                                    ( 8 )  
 
where   is a function of  , via period t wages, and of  , * t q t K 1 + t K  via expected returns 
on capital  .  ] [ 1 + t R E
(8) implicitly defines   capital as a function of capital in period t implicitly 
since the right hand side depends on expected 
1 + t
1 + t  profitability. Since K is the only 
state variable in the model, (8) is the law of motion for the economy. 
If we assume rational expectations of next period’s rental rate, we can derive the 
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Thus, assuming Inada conditions and that  C NG ′  is binding, (8) is always 
upward-sloping. This is equivalent to saying that under asymmetric information the 
positive capital at risk effect on borrowing constraints from rising wages is always larger 
than the negative profit effect from falling profitability of investment as the economy 
accumulates capital. However, for a general distribution of projects g(q) and a general 
production function, we cannot say very much about the curvature of the law of motion, 
required to draw conclusions about uniqueness and stability of a steady-state of the economy. 
Intuitively, the importance of the distribution g(q) is evident: the more 
concentrated projects are in the lower region of possible qs, the less severe is the 
rationing of investment due to borrowing limits. On the other hand the more large 
potential projects there are in the economy, the higher the benefits from measures that 
relax the rationing. 
It seems plausible that the number of projects in an economy decreases with size, i.e., 
that there are less large-scale projects than small-scale projects, which is equivalent to 
g(q) being a decreasing function. However, the distribution of capital as a function of 
project size, qg(q), may still be increasing or decreasing. For analytical tractability, we 
choose here the intermediate case, a uniform distribution of capital with respect to 
project size, which requires 
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Still, the curvature of the law of motion depends on the third derivative of the 
production function, which is not pinned down by our assumptions. Galor and Ryder 
(1989) show that Inada conditions do not suffice to ensure existence of a unique and 
stable non-trivial equilibrium in the Diamond (1965) model, and develop a set of 
strengthened Inada conditions that are sufficient. The conditions in our model are likely 
to be very different, given the additional link between periods due to the role of expected 
productivity for incentive constraints and thus current output. Therefore, we take a 
short-cut and assume a Cobb-Douglas production technology for our economy 
 
α α − = =
1 ) , ( N K N K F F .                                             ( A 6 )  
 
Remembering that labour supply is inelastic and normalised to one, and setting 
0 = q   for simplicity, we get the steady state capital stock, where  , as * 1 K K K t t = = +
9
 
8 Note, however, that the result about the slope of (10) and (8) depends on the way expectations are made 
about future productivity. If expectations are rational, i.e.,  1 + t K  is derived by agents using the true model of 
the economy (10), the above result holds. If however, expectations are completely naive, a simplifying 
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which can be negative or positive. The intuition for this is that with rational expectations an increase in period 
t capital affects period t+1 capital directly only by the wealth effect i.e., via period t wages that mitigates 
borrowing constraints, whereas the effect of diminishing returns in t+1 due to increased capital is second 
order and only shows up in the denominator. However, with naive expectations the diminishing return effect 
shows up directly as a downward effect on gains from higher capital as of period t, which is first order. Its 
magnitude depends on the bowedness of the production function (   being large or small) and of the stage 
of development (the amount of capital and therefore the magnitude of  ). 
KK F
K F
9 Note that   is not defined for  ) (q g 0 = q . However, since the probability of any particular value of q 
occurring is 0 for any continuous probability density function we implicitly exclude  0 = q  without  affecting 
the results.   
For general  q , the expression that defines K* in terms of the ratio between minimum project size and 
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So with Cobb-Douglas technology, the law of motion is concave in   and thus 
has a stable and unique steady state given by (11). 
t K
However, to characterise the law of motion for capital completely we have to bear in 
mind the assumptions made at the beginning of this section. First, we assumed NGC to 
bind and risky projects not to get finance, i.e.,   
for all t. Due to Inada conditions, this is certainly not the case for low values of K, where 
marginal productivity is high. Thus both of these conditions put a lower bound on capital 
in the economy even with financial frictions. Intuitively, even when  , 
entrepreneurs obtain outside finance until both the non-gambling condition and the 
individual rationality constraint for entrepreneurs with risky projects are binding. The 
corresponding lower bound on the capital stock of our open economy is thus 
} / ), 1 /( ) 1 ( min{ , πβ πβ π i i F R t K t − − < =
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So there is a jump in the law of motion at   to   or  , the level 
corresponding to a return of  . For all    the borrowing constraint NGC will be 
binding (this is since from the second period, K will always be greater than   and 
, as the law of motion is increasing in   for  all  ). 
0 = t K NGC K risky K
risky R 0 > t
NGC K
risky K t K 0 > t K
The third assumption we made when deriving the law of motion was  , i.e., 
that capital was lower than the full information level. This was necessary since the full 
information capital stock is a binding upper limit for 
K Kt ′ <
K : otherwise the capital output of 
investment projects would not be sufficient to meet (IR1) and (IR2), i.e., entrepreneurs 
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steady state capital per capita is  . TOBIAS BROER  60 
capital stock thus stays at  K′  for all periods when the law of motion (8) attains this 
upper limit. 












K .                                                      ( 1 4 )  
 
This yields proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1: Steady State Convergence 
 
With asymmetric information, the economy never jumps to its full information 
capital stock. Rather, there is always some process of convergence if the initial capital 




From (13) and (14) it is evident that max K K K risky NGC ′ < } , { , i.e., the lower bound of 
the capital stock is smaller than the full information capital stock for all parameter 










































.                            ( QED) 
 
Incorporating incentive constraints under international debt finance thus eliminates 
the usual instantaneous convergence of standard neoclassical growth models under 
international mobility of capital. 
However, this result might not be too relevant as long as we are sure that the 
economy eventually converges to the same long-run equilibrium. This is not necessarily 
the case, however, as long as the minimum project size is large enough. To show this, 
we express the minimum project size in terms of the steady state level of capital per 
capita, to get at least some idea of its magnitude. 
 
Proposition 2: Non-Convergence to the Full Information Steady State 
 
There is non-convergence in our economy if the minimum project size is sufficiently 
large. In other words, under asymmetric information capital stock and output are lower 
than those under full information even when the economy has converged to a steady 
state if   
 EMERGING MARKET LENDING: IS MORAL HAZARD ENDOGENOUS?  61 
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The proposition is easily derived from setting  K K ′ < *  and solving for q from 
(11) and (14). Note that since (10) is an increasing function for all parameter values, it 
never crosses  K′  as long as the steady state capital stock  * K  is  lower  than K′ . 
                                        ( Q E D )  
 
From proposition 2 it is immediate that agents that obtain funding for their project 
can earn rents in equilibrium, since whenever (14) holds marginal producitivity is 
strictly higher than i and (IR1) holds with equality. For specific parameter values the 
minimum  q  to get non-convergence may be greater than zero, but will often be 
significantly smaller than steady state capital per head. However, this result of course 
depends crucially on the simplifying assumption about the distribution of capital. 
Finally, since total (prudent) investment in the economy in period t is equal to period 
 capital, and savings are equal to wage payments, we get the possibility of 
South-North net investment, whenever savings are greater than domestic investment, a 
result known from Gertler and Rogoff (1990), or Boyd and Smith (1997). This is stated 
in proposition 3. 
1 + t
 
Proposition 3: South-North “Capital Flight” 
 
The economy will experience net capital outflows, whenever 
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The proposition follows from setting   by  solving  for  1 + > t t K w q.          ( Q E D )  
 
It is straightforward to substitute the steady state values for wages and capital in (16) 
to derive a condition for net outward investment in steady state. There is thus the 
possibility of transitory capital flight in the economy, if (16) holds in the initial stages of 
development, where wages are low, but not in steady state. 
Figure 4 summarises our results for the law of motion graphically for a Cobb-Douglas 
production technology, for a case where  . Note that    is bounded below 
by   and above by 
NGC K K = min 1 + t K
NGC K K′ . The dotted curves indicate laws of motion for different TOBIAS BROER  62 
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Figure 4.    The Law of Motion for Different Values of  q 
 
This section thus yields the main results of the paper: as long as we accept the 
assumptions on technology and the distribution of investment opportunities, there exists 
a single and unique steady state for our financially open model economy, despite 
 
10 Note that even for  q  very large, the t+1 capital stock at    stays  . Intuitively this is 
because at   the maximum project size is in fact infinite according to NGC’ (since the 
denominator is zero). The behaviour of   for rising 
0 = t K NGC K
NGC t K K = +1
1 + t K q  with   held constant can be seen by 
differentiating (8) with respect to 
t K
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This derivative is always negative when NGC is binding, but it goes to zero as   approaches 
 (since the denominator goes to plus infinity). Thus rising 
1 + t K
NGC K q  moves the law of motion downwards 
but the effect dampens out near  , i.e., the laws of motion start at the same point (0,  ) but are 
flatter than that for 
NGC K NGC K
0 = q , as drawn. EMERGING MARKET LENDING: IS MORAL HAZARD ENDOGENOUS?  63 
incentive constraints. Equivalently, the positive capital at risk effect strictly dominates 
the negative profit effect, of falling profitability of capital that tightens borrowing 
constraints. However, contrary to the full information case, incentive compatibility 
constraints always lead to a time-consuming process of convergence and possibly to net 
outward investment from developing countries. Steady state output and capital are for 
sufficient minimum project size strictly lower than the full-information level. That is, 
some entrepreneurs can be rationed in equilibrium: they have projects that could 
generate the required rate of return, but they do not obtain funds to finance the 
investment due to incentive constraints. 
 
4.4.  Monitoring  Contracts 
 
Section 4.3 is based on the assumption that lenders cannot observe the technology 
chosen by entrepreneurs at any cost. So it seems worthwhile to ask whether the results 
are robust to the introduction of costly monitoring of entrepreneurs by lenders. The 
answer to this question depends on the cost structure of monitoring. This section briefly 
discusses two polar cases: proportional and fixed monitoring costs. 
In the simplest case, monitoring costs are proportional to the size of the loan. This 
introduces an external finance premium for projects that cannot meet NGC equal to the 
per unit monitoring cost. If the latter are high enough, entrepreneurs that fail to meet 
NGC will prefer to invest in safe international financial assets and the results are 
unchanged. With intermediate monitoring costs, some risky projects will get realised 
(and monitored) in the initial stages of development when expected returns are high, but 
not when the marginal productivity of capital decreases towards the international interest 
rate during the development process. 
Broer (2001) considers the opposite case of fixed monitoring costs. In this case there 
are returns to scale from monitoring large projects, so the external finance premium of 
projects that cannot meet NGC declines with their size. The companion paper shows that 
this can lead to a “gap in the credit supply”, where small projects get standard debt, very 
large projects get monitoring contracts (interpreted as foreign direct investment in Broer 
(2001)), but medium-sized projects are rationed in equilibrium. 
 
 
5.  RESPONSE  TO  PRODUCTIVITY  SHOCKS 
 
In order to get the response of the economy to productivity shocks, we add a 
stochastic shock term    to the production function  t θ
 
) ( ) ( t t t K F K G θ = .                                                   ( 1 7 )  
 
We thus get the responses of  1 + t  capital to productivity shocks by implicitly 
differentiating (8): TOBIAS BROER  64 
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A negative shock to period t productivity and thus to the wage rate at time t 
inevitably reduces period   capital and wealth by tightening the NGC and thus the 
borrowing limit. 
1 + t




If an economy is borrowing constrained due to limited wealth, one-time negative 
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Thus, our model predicts financial conditions (here entrepreneur wealth) to have real 
effects by causing lasting consequences of one-time shocks, as in the “financial 
accelerator” models of for example Bernanke and Gertler (1989). 





An expected negative shock to the economy is anticipated by a credit crunch. 
 
Proof 
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To prove proposition 5 it is sufficient to show that t+1 capital inputs ( ) depend 
positively on expected shocks to t+1 
1 + t K
output, or productivity ( ), i.e., that there is a 
credit crunch at the end of period t as a result of lower expected profits in t+1. 
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This study has shown that moral hazard, resulting from information asymmetries in 
financial markets, may have important consequences for growth in financially open 
developing countries. We showed that if domestic entrepreneurs can gamble with 
creditors’ money, standard debt finance is constrained by their own capital at risk in 
their project, as indicated by a No-Gambling Condition similar to that of Hellmann, 
Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000). This can be an important constraint for capital-poor 
developing economies. 
The constraint was shown to be endogenous in the development process via the 
effect of growth on capital at risk and profits to capital investment: first of all, there is a 
threshold for returns to capital above which entrepreneurs never have incentives to 
gamble. Capital accumulation, by reducing marginal returns to capital and investment, 
was thus shown to give rise to moral hazard at some point of the development process. 
However, we also showed that once one takes into account the positive effect of capital 
accumulation on wealth and thus entrepreneurs’ capital at risk, further development 
alleviates the No-Gambling constraint. The steady state was shown to be unique and 
stable under Cobb-Douglas production technology, and may involve rationing of 
potentially profitable projects. Depending on the minimum scale of investment projects, 
there can be positive net investment from developing countries in international financial 
markets. Also, one period shocks to our economy have lasting effects in the future, and 
expected future shocks are anticipated by lenders’ behaviour today. 
In summary, our study suggests that while there might be other benefits of 
international financial liberalisation, the effect of international capital mobility on capital 
accumulation in poor countries is not unambiguously beneficial as simple models would 
suggest. Even our limited amendment of an otherwise very neo-classical framework, to 
include limited information about investment choices, has led to a much more pragmatic 
picture of the effects of international financial liberalisation on development. 
What could be the appropriate policy responses to the described consequences of TOBIAS BROER  66 
moral hazard in emerging market lending? One reason for the problem is clearly the lack 
of entrepreneurs’ own capital. A domestic equity market where agents can pool wealth 
to provide equity for investment projects can have positive consequences, at least if 
information asymmetries within countries are less severe than internationally. Also, 
using the idea of “non-pecuniary penalties” put forward by Diamond (1984), 
governments could use their discretion over the non-financial inconveniences associated 
to bankruptcy (preclusion from starting a new business, imprisonment for financial fraud, 
etc.), to ease the effect of limited financial liability. 
Inevitably, our simple analytical framework gives rise to several possible extensions. 
First of all, the assumption of unobservable technology choices is a strong one. As 
mentioned above, a companion paper (Broer (2001)) looks at the role of costly 
monitoring in this context, where outside investors have the possibility to observe 
entrepreneurs’ investment decisions at a certain cost. 
Also, ideally we would like to relax the specific assumption on the probability 
distribution of projects over size, to show the conditions under which our results 
continue to hold, or more interestingly under which development dynamics present 
unstable or multiple equilibria. Furthermore, a more general production function with 
human capital might be able to show the trade-off between capital-at-risk-increasing 
accumulation of production capital and productivity-increasing accumulation of human 
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